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for the Degree of Master of Architecture
Six significant zoning exclusions and restrictions of mobile homes in
the land-use control system are identified for study: complete exclusion,
exclusion from residential districts, restriction to mobile home parks,
indirect exclusions, limitations on the number of iobile homes and parks
in a municipality, and limitations on the duration of stay.
Six hypotheses are formulated which explain the preferences of municipal-
ities to adopt one or more of the exclusions and restrictions. These
are first tested by crosstabulation and then by a linear probability
model. A ninety-six city and town sample is used. The fear of declining
property values and fiscal zoning are both substantiated as motivations
for the exclusion of mobile homes. However, the method by which mobile
homes are taxed appears to have no association with the decision to
exclude mobile homes; it is a significant determinant of the restriction
of mobile homes te parks and the restriction to nonresidential areas.
A two equation simultaneous equation model of the mobile home housing
3market is constructed to analyze the impact of these land use controls
on the rental market. This is later compared with the entire mobile home
market. This model tends to support the conclusion that the complete
exclusion of mobile homes has no significant impact on the market. The
restriction of mobile homes to parks and the restriction to nonresidential
areas, however, both depress the quantity of mobile homes in the market.
The restriction of mobile homes to parks increases the percentage of
rental mobile homes in the entire market and lowers their price.
The rental market is shown to have a supply curve with negative slope.
The results are summarized in consideration of their impact on the
industrialization of housing and three present trends: increased judicial
supervision, state and Federal assumption of land-use controls, and
the increased concurrent use of subdivision controls and the restriction
of mobile homes to mobile home parks.
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A. INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Mobile homes, long ignored by both the government and the conventional
housing industry as a legitimate form of housing, received recognition
at the end of the 1960's out of political and economic necessity.
Housing institutions that were suffering from a slowdown in conventional
housing realized that mobile home production had not suffered the same
fate and was, in fact, growing. Because of this very recent date of
recognition, the young age of the industry itself, and its still limited
product, information concerning the industry is limited. Statistical
reporting on the mobile home sector of the housing industry is still
much less extensive or- comprehensive than on the conventional sector. For
this reason, as much as any other, literature in this field is almost
always qualitative, and often simply supposition.
The aim of this thesis, then, is to verify certain relationships and
phenomena commonly supposed to exist in the land use control system
regulating mobile homes.and the interaction of this control system with
the mobile home component of the housing market.
The author's awareness of this problem developed out of preliminary
work focused on the extent of land use controls regulating mobile homes
and their impacts on the mobile home. This work was done for the Program
in Industrialization of the Housing Sector at the MIT Urban Systems
Laboratory. Program Industrialization is a H.U.D. financed study of the
mobile home industry as an example of comprehensive industrialization of
the entire housing sector. The objective is to determine the real-
istic potential of the mobile home industry for further improving its
performance and to develop an implementing strategy.
In this context, the primary motivation of this thesis is a concern
for impacts of land-use controls on the potential of the mobile home
industry to develop.as a resource capable of supplying high quality,
low-cost urban housing. The Townland proposal for Operation Breakthrough
(illustration on followinq page) is an example of medium density housing
within the present technological capacities of the mobile home industry.
The Townland proposal, one of the finalists selected for construction
by H.U.D., consisted of a pre-cast concrete megastructure with two story
spaces for infill with modules. Unfortunately, the Townland system)
when finally built in Seattle~was a low. density development with only
nine units one level above the ground.
Mobile homes, like the conventional sector, are dependent on a complex,
inter-connected set of industries and institutions. These include Fed-
eral monetary policy, financing, property taxation, marketing, raw
material suppliers, investors and developers, labor unions, and the
builders themselves. Land-use controls are but one of these institutions
that affect the make-up of the overall package of goods and services
called housing.
The discriminatory and sometimes exclusionary nature of land-use controls
applied to mobile homes can impact the industry's potential for improving
Illustration 1. The Townland Operation Breakthrough Proposal
Source: U.S. Dept. of H.U.D. , Housing Systems for Operation Breakthrough
performance in two major ways. First, by limiting the availability of
land they limit the quantity of mobile homes sold in an industry that
depends on continuous high volume operation for efficiency, thereby
affecting price, revenues, the availability of a range of product lines,
and eventually capital for research and product development. Second,
the discriminatory nature of the land-use control system may create a
product differentiation of greater extent than called for by the physical
nature of the present day mobile home. The restriction of mobile homes
to industrial and commercial areas or to marginal quality land and their
concurrent segregation from other residential neighborhoods defines the
mobile home housing package as much as the physical attributes of the
mobile home. This reduces the competitiveness of- the mobile home in the
housing market, but, more importantly, it influences efforts to improve
design. What are the motivations on the part of the manufacturers to
produce high quality housing if it will be in many cases restricted to
inferior and undesirable locations. Several past attempts at product
development have been unsuccessful. The National Homes Corporation,
the industry's tenth largest producer, asked the Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation to design a new product line. The designs were never fully
implemented, in part because it was thought the units would have had
to have been tied to a planned development of their own.
Besides the primary motivation concerning the potential of the mobile
home industry as outlined above, this thesis is relevant to two other
areas of concern. First, there has been a growing body of literature
exariining the impact of subdivision controls and zoning on the cost of
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housing. In addition, the use of exclusionary zoning to prevent the
construction of suburban housing for low-income families has been the
subject of much discussion and some litigation. The actions directed
at mobile homes are a specific subset of the same land-use control system
regulating conventional housing. The means by which mobile homes are
regulated and especially the concerns of municipalities and the benefits
of their actions are often'equally present in the conventional sector
and explain parallel actions.
Second, the short run impacts of the land-use control system on the mobile
home housing market is of interest, notwithstanding the long term poten-
tial of the mobile home industry. The mobile home represents today a sig-
nificant segment of housing construction in the United States. Likewise,
the environmental and monetary costs borne by real or potential occupants
of mobile homes for excesses of the land-use control system are significant.
It is significant because the mobile home provides the overwhelming maj-
ority of new housing for sale under $20,000, enabling a significant segment
of the population to attain the goal of homeownership. In 1972, 575,000
mobile homes were produced and shipped to dealers in all fifty states. In
the same year, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported 1,309,000 single
family fousing starts. Mobile home production represents 30% of the combined
figure of the total year round housing stock in several states.
B. APPLICATION OF THE ZONING
SYSTEM TO MOBILE HOMES
Zoning predates the early travel trailers, predecessors of today's
mobile home, by at least a decade. It was in the context of this early
zoning, aimed primarily at the protection of the status quo of estab-
lished residential neighborhoods 1, that the first land-use regulation
of mobile homes was implemented. First developed as vacation trailers,
during the Depression the travel trailer was used as primary housing by
impoverished families when conventional housing was unavailable to them.
The initial reaction of municipalities and property owners to these
shanty-towns of travel trailers was decidedly negative: they were pro-
hibited entirely or restricted to the most undesirable and out of the
way locations.
Today, mobile homes have gradually again become a significant segment
of the housing stock, providing shelter for families who have been
priced out of conventional home ownership by the high cost of new housing.
Unfortunately, a great deal of the land-use control attitudes of the
thirties and forties regulating mobile homesstill remain. Despite
positive and radical changes in the appearance and operation of mobile
homes and parks in the 1950's, the response of regulatory bodies has not
altered in a fundamental way. The mobile home has developed in a climate
of municipal and neighborhood hostility which has impeded efforts to
effect an accommodation between mobile homes and other uses of land.
While a few communities still regulate mobile homes under zoning and
subdivision ordinances sLstantially unchanged in the past twenty years 2
manystill do not recognize mobile homes as a bona fide setment of the
housing stock. In a 1971 national survey, it was reported that 45% of
jurisdictions fail to distinguish between travel trailers and mobile
homes, today two decidedly different products, originating from two
different industries. 3
In this chapter the major exclusionary and restrictive devices applied
by local communities to mobile homes are outlined; -the-frequency- of-
their -application is presented in the next chapter. Sample ordinances
are presented to illustrate typical applications. Occasionally, legal
cases are cited to provide an indication of judicial response and limits
on municipal action. More detailed and exhaustive discussions can be
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found in Hodes and Robertson .
Each of the categories cited can appear in a number of forms. What
follows is a categorization of a complex and varied system whose actual
implementation depends on its administration, state enabling legislation,
judicial response, and especially the hidden agenda behind each ordinance.
Complete Exclusion
A municipality can completely exclude mobile homes by ordinance. In
California, such local ordinances are expressly authorized by statute
if within the reasonable exercise of police power5. However, in other
states, notably in Michigan and Pennsylvania, an outright ban has
freq~ently been invalidated. For example, a Pennsylvania ordinance that
was invalidated prohibited
"any person or persons from parking or locating any trailer which
is or can be used for living-quarters on any lot, property, or
street within the limits of the Township of Tinicum, or to maintain
or use any trailer camp or tourist camp within the township"
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court, has sustained the
validity of an ordinance prohibiting mobile homes 7, though the notable
dissenting opinion by Justice Hall has been influential in recent lit-
igation of exclusionary zoning in general. The U.S. Supreme Court
declined to hear the New Jersey Case as it has most zoning litigation
since the constitutionality of zoning was established in the late twenties. 8
This has left a confusing web of contradictions between states on the
limits of zoning as each state court applied its own interpretation.
More frequently, intentionally or unintentionally, the complete exclusion
of mobile homes is accomplished by a failure to make any provision for
them in the zoning ordinance. Whether or not not a municipality effectively
excludes mobile homes by zoning most of its land single family
residential will often depend on the legal definition of a mobile home.
Although a conventional dwelling may be variously designated as a "house",
"building", "structure", or "detached single family dwelling", the applic-
ation of these terms to a mobile home in use, as a dwelling has frequently-
been the cause of a confusing and contradictory series of litigations.
Exclusion from Residential Districts
While not explicitly prohibiting mobile homes, a zoning ordinance may
exclude them from residential districts, reflecting an original purpose
of zoning, the protection of the status quo in established residential
areas. Frequently, they will be restricted to industrial and commercial
areas on the theory that a mobile home park (often regulated with
trailer parks) is a business endeavor (on the order of a motel). A
typical example of this is in Edmonton, Alberta where mobile home parks
"are channeled to C-8 and C-9 districts. The stated purpose
of the C-8 Highway Commercial District is "to provide sufficient
land adjacent to major routes entering the city for uses serving
the travelling public, and of the C-9 Major Arterial Commercial
District" to provide accommodation and other services necessary
for the convenience of people using certain major routes within
the city".
Such restrictions have generally been upheld by 'the judiciary. Of all
the techniques in the land use control system, this is perhaps the most
effective device used in protecting the single family detached resi-
dential district from the perceived costs of the mobile home.
Indirect Exclusions
Indirect exclusions are probably as common as explicit prohibition and
generally have the same effect. Moreover, a community desirous of
excluding mobile homes from its boundaries has a better chance of with--_
standing constitutional challenges if it employs discrete, indirect de-
vices. Minimum floor area requirements, minimum lot sizes, maximum
height and bulk requirements, minimum sideyards, minimum number of bedrooms
and building code restrictions are examples of such devices that mobile
homes often intrinsically violate.
A second class of indirect exclusions are conditional uses and special
exceptions, where a community allows mobile homes after the issuance
of a permit or vote of the zoning board, but in practice denies all
applications for permits. This may well be a common occurrence, but differ-
cult to document. For example, in Beaumont, Texas, a typical ordinance that
allows and could encourage such action reads:
"No trailer park shall be built, established or operated within
the city except in C-1, C-2, I-1 and 1-2 districts, as established
in Sections 42-17, 42-18, 42-19 and 42-20, and then only by a
special permit granted by the city council. In granting a special
permit for trailer parks in the districts named, the city council
may impose appropriate conditions and safeguards, including a
specified period of time for the permit, to conserve and protect
property and property values in the neighborhood." 10
Restriction of Mobile Homes to Mobile Home Parks
This restriction is one that is often advocated by planners in the name
of good planning. There is a belief that "as a general rule, mobile
homes belong in mobile home parks, and the municipal zoning ordinances
should assure that their location is restricted to such areas.""
A typical restriction is this ordinance from Wichita Falls, Texas:
"No person shall park or occupy any mobile home outside an
approved mobile home park; except, the parking of only one mobile
home behind the building setback lines of a platted lot is permitted
providing no living quarters shall be maintained in such mobile
home while such mobile home is so parked or stored. A mobile home
may be occupied for business or residential use outside a licensed
mobile home park when its wheels are removed and when mounted upon
a permanent type foundation and as such shall conform to all appli-
cable requirements of the building, electrical and plumbing codes
and all other applicable codes and ordinances of the City. Mobile
homes used as field offices during construction or mobile homes
displayed for sale on mobile home sales lots and mobile home manu-
facturing plants are permitted." 12
It is difficult to judge the benefits or the costs of such action.
Traditionally justified on health and sanitation .grounds, it is frequently
used today as a method of enabling more effective government control.
The perceived difficulty of discovery for taxation purposes is often
cited. Left unmentioned is the threat of mobile homes locating in conven-
tional neighborhoods and affecting property values if not confined to parks.
The impact of~this restriction on mobile home dwellers is also difficult
to judge. By choice or necessity most do live in mobile home parks. 13
Two thirds of the new mobile homes sold in 1968 were placed in a mobile
home park.14 Johnson has demonstrated that for certain age and socio-
economic groupings, especially the white working class retired, the mobile
home park is an ordered, close-knit community, preferred over the outside
world.
Restriction on the Number of Mobile Homes and Parks in a Municipality
Every community that permits mobile homes within its borders does, in
theory, restrict the number of mobile homes in that community. The
amount of suitable land zoned to be available for mobile homes and mobile
home parks, together with density or lot size controls when they exist,
places an upper limit on the number of mobile homes. A theoretical
limit also occurs, of course, with the regulation of conventional
housing; what is of interest is when these controls are overly restrictive
and unreasonable.
Occasionally, a municipality may set an upper limit on the number of mobile
homes in a park regardless of size. Municipalities in Wisconsin are
expressly authorized to "limit the number of units, trailers or mobile
homes that may be parked or kept in any one camp or park."16
In Town of Yorkville v. Fonk 7 a Wisconsin town was sustained in its
attempt to limit a mobile home park to twenty-five units on the grounds
that it bore a reasonable relationship to the welfare of the school
district. The Court pointed out that the school district could not
adequately plan for the future in the absence of the assurance that
the number of mobile homes would remain relatively constant and that
the ordinance was reasonably intended to stabilize the problems created
by the transient nature of mobile homes so that the school district
may cope with them. This argument is meaningless given today's non-
transient mobile home. However, the speed by which mobile homes can
be sited in a community, when compared with conventional housing, does
make this argument relevant today.
It should be pointed out that as restrictionsbecome more severe, a limit
of complete exclusion of mobile homes is reached when the mobile home park
owner or developer finds it uneconomical to operate.
Limitation of Stay
An anachronism from the days of transient vacation trailers, limitation
of stay ordinances remain and are applied to mobile homes. Ordinances
limiting the period during which mobile homes may remain within a
municipality take a number of forms, including a -prohibition of habita-
tion in excess of a stated time; requirement of a non-renewable permit
to occupy; and imposition of stringent building provisions upon mobile
homes remaining longer than a certain time. Formerly the period.of
limitation was sixty or ninety days. More recent ordinances have limited
the stay of mobile homes to a month or twenty-eight days, or even as little
as seventy-two hours. Sooner or later, the time limit becomes so short
as to be an outright prohibition.18  Indeed, considering todays mobile
home, almost any time limit effectively excludes the use of most mobile
homes as residences entirely.
Limitation of stay ordinances have been based on health and sanitation
grounds and, also,have been based on the desire to promote transiency
in mobile homes. It has been felt that the use of mobile homes for perm-
enent residences is a cause of slums, and that any method forcing the
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the transiency of mobile homes is in the public interest. It is
difficult to see how forcing transiency on the mobile home dweller bene-
fits him; while the city still has the mobile home park to contend with,
as one trailer is forced to leave another can take its place.- Many
individuals have yet to understand the metamorphosis of the vacation
trailer into the mobile home.
Summary
The preceding six categories of restriction are implemented in several
ways. One of the most important distinctions is the case where mobile
homes or mobile home parks are allowed as a right and the case where they
are allowed as a conditional use, special exception, or in a floating
zone. While this can be used as a method of exclusion (pa-ge17), even
when it is not it at least discourages development and places costs on
the owner or developer seeking approval. This is'often a beneficial
situation for the municipality and perhaps the mobile home occupant,
as the park developer can be forced to build a higher quality park than
required by the market to secure the municipality's approval. The mobile
home dweller is forced to pay for improvements he would not have other-
wise required; his benefit is questionable, and depends on the public
benefit of the municipality.
Subdivision controls have only recently been applied to mobile home
developments as the mobile home subdivision (where one owns the land instead
of renting it as in a mobile home park) is of fairly recent origin. Laws
governing subjects such as density, design, and landscaping in mobile
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home parks are more apt to be found in state laws concerned with health
and sanitation requirements of parks. The states have for the most
part also pre-empted the municipalities in the area of building codes
governing mobile home construction standards. However, mobile homes can
often still be subject to local building code standard regulations in-
cluding minimum floor area per occupant, minimum volume requirements,
and otheyt discussed on page 17.
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C. ZONING PREFERENCES
OF MUNICIPALITIES
Frequency of Use
The inherent power of the state to zone has largely been delegated to
localities through various zoning and planning enabling acts. As a con-
sequence, there are over ten thousand zoning ordinances of varying scope
and purpose in this nation.1  Information regarding the zoning ordinances
in the nation is incomplete, unwieldy, and often simply not available.
Further, the status of mobile homes in these ordinances is obscured by the
manner in which mobile homes are regulated and defined. Nevertheless,
there are a small number of useful studies available on a state and region-
al basis.2
This information has recently been complemented by the Industrialized
Housing Program at M.I.T. when the mobile home zoning practices of muni-
cipalities in each state was surveyed in 1973.3 An appropriate official
in each state government or regional trade association was contacted
through correspondence and personal interview and asked to provide
appropriate information available on the status of land use controls con-
cerning mobile homes in his state. The information received ranged,
depending on the state, from reliable surveys that had previously been con-
ducted by state organizations to knowledgeable estimates by state planning
individuals and trade association officials.
Of the six types of land use controls introduced in the preceding chapter,
adequate data has been secured on only three of them to be of further
interest in the following analysis. The limitation of stay restriction
probably occurs or is enforced very infrequently. It is left over from
the early days of mobile home development. Similarly, information on the
frequency of the application of indirect exclusions and restrictions on
the number of mobile homes and parks in a municipality is quite difficult
to obtain, partly because these restrctions are often an implicit attempt
at exclusion where an explicit ban is neither possible nor desirable.
The frequency of use of the three remaining land use controls developed
earlier are reviewed below. These three controls are the complete
exclusion of mobile homes, the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home
parks, and the restriction of mobile homes to non-residential areas.
These are the most often used land use controls affecting mobile homes
and are thought to have the greatest impact.
Complete Exclusion
The fraction of municipalities in a state excluding mobile homes ranges
from zero to 95% (New Jersey). Table 1 shows the geographical distribu-
tion of the frequency of the use of exclusionary legislation. It dis-
plays the mean percentage of complete exclusion for states in a region
or district. It can be seen that the states on the eastern seaboard have
a much larger percentage of their municipalities excluding mobile homes
than the rest of the country. The average percentage of municipalities
that exclude mobile homes in a Northeastern state is 40%. A cautionary
note is in order: this is not the same as the percentage of municipali-
ties'in a region banning mobile homes. Also, seeming low percentages can
be misleading. For example, Colorado has only one percent of its muni-
TABLE 1 Mean Percentage by Each Census Region and Distric of Municipalities in a State that Employ a
Specific Land Use Control - All figures are in percentages.*
NEW ENGLAND
MIDDLE ATLANTIC
Northeast
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Northcentral
SOUTH ATLANTIC
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL
South
MOUNTAIN
PACIFIC
West
U.S.A.
ALL MUNICIPALITIES
COMPLETE
EXCLUSION
RESTRICTED
MH PARKS
37.5
72.5
46.3
18.3
3.1
8.6
16.4
5.3
0.0
10.9
1.7
18.8
8.5
16.3
11.9
7.5
10.8
38.3
45.5
42.8
58.8
14.5
30.0
42.0
21.7
38.5
28.4
33.3
ALL MUNICIPALITIES
ALLOWING MOBILE HOMES
RESTRICTION
MH PARKS
36.5
51.0
40.2
50.6
48.5
49.3
72.6
44.8
30.3
58.6
32.6
51.1
40.0
48.4
EXCLUSION FROM
RESIDENTIAL
AREAS
14.5
94.0
34.4
.48.8
6.1
21.6
27.4
8.8
25.0
21.7
3.2
18.3
9.2
21.1
* no data available
Source: Program in
for Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon
the Industrialization of the Housing Sector, M.I.T. Urban Systems Laboratory.
cipalities excluding mobile homes; but this one percent includes Denver,
which accounts for thirty percent of Colorado's population. The data is
displayed this way for lack of more information. Total land area ex-
cluding mobile homes or total population excluding mobile homes would
have been more informative but cannot be derived from this data.
Restriction to Mobile Home Parks
The frequency of the restriction to mobile home parks is summarized in
the same manner in the second column of Table 1. The absolute percentage
of this restriction is misleading when compared between states without
considering the number of municipalities that do.not exclude mobile
homes. For example, three to four percent of both New Hampshire's and
New Jersey's municipalities require mobile homes to be in parks. Yet
this represents 80% of all New Jersey municipalities allowing mobile homes
and only 3% of the New Hampshire municipalities that allow mobile homes.
The percentage of all municipalities in a state allowing mobile homes
that require location in a mobile home park is shown in the third column
of Table 1. The use of this device displays less of a pattern and
range than does the complete exclusion of mobile homes. It ranges from
40%to 50% among the four regions, while complete expulsion varies from
9%to 46%.
Exclusion from Residential Areas
The incidence of exclusion from residential areas or restriction to
industrial-commercial areas is also summarized in Table 1 in a similar
manner. The Middle Atlantic states have a exceedingly high figure, a
mean of 94%. The East North Central States also have a high figure,
though there is a greater amount of variance in this sample.
Intrastate Distribution of Frequency
To accurately interpret the preceding one must understand the pattern
of restriction and exclusion inside the state. There are several studies
helpful-in this task. One done by the state of Illinois and another done
for the American Society of Planning Officials are reviewed in the foli -
lowing section.
Mobile homes and mobile home parks are generally restricted more often
in urban situations than in rural. A variety of factors, but especially
land economics and the mobile home's inherent low density configuration,
are probably responsible. As shown below, urban and suburban areas are
likely to exclude mobile homes through zoning and/or restrict them to
commercialor industrial zones whereas rural areas are not as likely to
engage in such exclusionary practices.
The results of an Illinois survey of officials and lawyers involved in
zoning are shown in Table 2. This response can be interpreted as par-
allel to the percentage of municipalities used in the previous tables.
"What would appear of most interest in Table 2 is the difference be-
,tween urban and rural with respect to residential and multifamily
residential zones. First, comparing on the basis of total cases (612),
TABLE 2
Urban or Rural Location by Type of Zone Mobile Home Permitted In
Locati on
Urban (%) Rural (%)
Type of Zone Permitted In of Col of Total of Col
Commercial
Light Commercial
Industrial
Light Industrial
Residential
Multi-family residential
Agricultural
Source: Illiritis Zoning Laws Study Commission
of Total
17.3
11.1
16.8
20.4
11.5
12.7
10.2
6.4
4.1
6.2
7.5
4.2
4.7
3.8
15.8
11.7
11.1
11.1
17.4
15.8
17.1
10.0
7.4
7.0
7.0
10.9
10.0
10.8
rural respondents were twice as likely to report mobile homes in
residential zones (4.2% urban, 10.9% rural). The same held for
multifamily dwellings (4.7% urban, 10% rural). Urban area respon-
dents indicated mobile homes were most prevalent in light industrial
districts (20.4%), commercial (17.3%) and industrial (16.8%). Rural
area respondents overall were more evenly spread between residential
(17.4%), agricultural (17.1%), multi-family residential (15.8%) and
commercial (15.8%).
Thus, from figures based on both column and totals, it appears
that urban areas are more exclusive where mobile homes are permitted,
if permitted at all. Commercial districts for both urban and
rural respondents seem to be a compromise district."4
The results from a survey, conducted by Fredrick Blair for the American
Society of Planning Officials Planning Advisory Service, at 287 jurisdic-
tions selected from subscribers of A.S..P.O.'s Planning Advisory Service,
presents the pattern of exclusion of mobile homes clearly. Mobile homes
on individual lots, in mobile home parks, and in mobile home subdivisions
(where one owns a lot instead of renting one), are distinguished. The
survey goes beyond a mere distinction between urban and rural locations;
they are disaggregated to central city, urban county, suburban city, rural
county and independent city. See Table 3. It is interesting to note the
similarities between the regulation of individual lots and subdivision;
mobile home subdivisions are excluded almost as often as mobile homes on
individual lots. The county is less restrictive than the adjacent city
in urban, suburban and rural situations, for all three forms of mobile
TABLE 3
Mobile Homes Excluded on Individual Lots, in
Parks, and in Subdivisions by Type of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
Central city:
Urban county:
Suburban city:
Suburban county:
Independent city:
Rural county:
Total:
Completely
Excluded
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Parks
Subdivisions
Individual lots
Source: Adapted from A.S.P.0. Planning Advisory Service Report no. 265.
18.9%
50.0
69.1
8.7
34,2
33.3
29.0
73.8
80.0
21.7
50.0
47.8
19.7
61.2
75.4
13.6
33.3
25.0
19.7
53.6
61.1
home siting. Also, the suburban city and county are much more exclu-
sionary than their urban and rural counterparts; the independent city
is more restrictive than the central city, while the rural county about
equals the urban county, but note: rural counties often restrict parks
while urban counties do not, and urban counties are more likely to res-
trict mobile homes on individual lots than are rural counties.
Formulation of Municipal Preferences
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the development of six hy-
potheses explaining the preferences of municipalities in the application
of zoning to mobile homes and the testing of these hypotheses. Several
authors have attempted to explain why municipalities adopt a particular
zoning ordinance regulating mobile homes. For the most part, the litera-
ture usually is theoretical, quite general and often only suppositional.
Margaret Drury suggests that
"usually, the reason for opposition to mobile home parks is grounded
in fears that property values in the surrounding areas will decrease.
This fear developed, quite understandably, because of the image people
held of the first parks.. .. Opposition also grows out of a fear of
increased taxes, because more services will be needed if mobile home
parks are allowed." 5
The Douglas Commission presents two slightly different arguments.
"The exclusion of mobile homes in large part reflects a stereotyping
of their appearance and of their occupants. Many see mobile homes
as unattractive and occupied by peopl e who do not take care of their
homes or neighborhood. Such images are often derived from viewing
mobile homes in the midst of industrial districts, to which they are
so often relegated. Moreover, there are sometimes fiscal reasons
for exclusion in addition to those generally applicable to housing
which might accommodate low and moderate-income families. In many
areas mobile homes are not taxable as real property. And in some
States they are not subject to' local personal property taxes be-
cause of special State levies, the imposition of which may exempt
them from local taxes. In New York State, mobile homes are taxable
as real property, and the fiscal motive for exclusion is accordingly
reduced. The high exclusion rate in New York (over 50%) may thus
indicate an even greater amount of exclusion, in other States." 6
Similarly, Anderson states that
"Mobile homes do not look like conventional dwellings. This dif-
ference in appearance is sufficient to persuade many municipalities
that a mobile home will depress property values....Because many
mobile homes can be sited rapidly and in a relatively small area,
they are capable of imposing a sudden and severe load on all
municipal facilities....(mobile homes) are regarded as freelcaders
and efforts are made to exclude them or to confine them to the
least desirable land in the community."7
The preceding arguments as well as others are postulating a rational
decision-making process on the part of municipalities, usually through
city councils- and planning boards, that reflects the costs and benefits
of mobile homes at the municipal level and fails to consider the metropo-
litan and regional impacts of their actions. This is usually aimed at
protecting property values, the level of the property tax, and municipal
budget. Most make no distinction, however, between the complete exclusion
of mobile homes and other restrictive measures such as the exclusion from
residential areas and the restriction to mobile home parks. None dis-
tinguish between what may be different motivations behind the various
exclusions and restrictions.
Of the three quotes, the Douglas Commission has one of the most explicit
arguments. They suggest that, in states where mobile homes are not sub-
ject to real estate or personal property taxes, a municipality's propen-
sity to exclude mobile homes is greater than it otherwise would be. There
are two explanations for such a relationship. The first is a result of
structural difference between the two methods of taxation. Real estate
and personal property taxes are paid directly to the municipality by the
mobile home owner while vehicular license fees or~special mobile home
fees are most often paid to the state or county. They are received by
the municipality on paper in the midst of other intergovernmental
assesments and disbursements of funds(such as the cherry sheet in Mass-
achusetts). The municipalities, seeing a direct fiscal cost for local
services for mobile homes and an indirect revenue source, make an emotional
decision to exclude mobile homes.
The second explanation gives more credit to the intelligence of citizens
and municipal actions. The real estate tax and personal property tax will
usually provide much higher revenue levels than the license or fee. While
there is argument over whether or not mobile homes when taxed as property
are a net fiscal cost or benefit, they more closely approach a net benefit
when subject only to typically smaller vehicular license fees. If
one assumes that one of the considerations behind zoning is the fiscal impact
of various land uses, then the exclusion of mobile homes in municipalities
where mobile homes are not subject to real estate and property taxes is a
rational and understandable action.
The last sentence of Drury's reasoning also suggests that mobile homes
are excluded as a result of fiscal zoning. They are perceived as not paying
their "fair share" of taxes in consideration for the municipal services
they "consume" and are, therefore, excluded to protect the municipal budget
and out of fears of rising property taxes. If this is accurate, then it
will be true to the extent of a municipality's dependence on the property
tax for revenue. In localities where sales, income and other taxes are
a significant portion of its revenue, its motivation to engage in such
fiscal zoning is correspondingly reduced.
If the exclusion of mobiles homes is the result of fiscal zoning, one other
relationship may be observed. While the cost of most municipal services
is difficult to assign to specific users, the expenditures on schools
can conviently be so assigned. Since this is also a large portion of a
community's expenditures, sometimes over half, it is often applied as an
easily understood yardstick when a municipality considers the impacts of
alternative land uses. Multifamily dwellings are often excluded or restrict-
ed to one bedroom units for this reason. Since mobile homes are also seen
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to be dense land users, the percentage of a municipality's expendi-
tures spent on schools would then by positively correlated with its pro-
pensity to ban mobile homes for fiscal concerns. This would be true
for two reasons. First, a few municipalities that are predominately
retirements communities (such as those in Florida) would have smaller
school budgets and less.need to engage in fiscal zoning. Second,
municipalities that are not directly responsible for raising money for
schools would not be immediately concerned with the school budget.
In cases where schools are the responsibility of an autonomous school
district with its own powers to raise m oney, the local governments,
while ultimately affected, are not as strongly motivated to concern
themselves with the impact of their actions on the school population.
Mobile homes are thought to be excluded for reasons other than fiscal.
The fear of depressed property values and the desire to live among indi-
viduals of equal socio-economic status are often cited. As occupants of
mobile homes are for the most part in low-income brackets, the wealthy
communities are more likely to exclude mobile homes than the less wealthy.
This does not negate the observation that the exclusion of low-income
housing may be what insures a municipality's wealth in the first place.
It does provide a test for the socio-economic exclusion, and when wealth
is measured by the median value of single family dwellings in the community,
it provides a possible test for the property value argument, if one assumes
that any decrease in property value due to mobile homes not being excluded
is not extreme. While not ruling out an individual negative effect, a
substantial change in the median value is not expected.
The Anderson quote presents a reason that often appears in legal argu-
ments (page 16) justifying restrictions. "Because (mobile homes) can
be sited rapidly and in a relatively small area, they are capable of
imposing a sudden and severe load on all municipal facilities." This
is difficult to test in the scope of the following analysis. Municipali-
ties experiencing rapid growth would be more apt to exclude mobile homes,
when each of the previously mentioned reasons would be more immediate
and the threat of mobile homes establishing themselves more prominent.
This will be true if one assumes mobile homes are not an important com-
ponent of growth when the ordinance was passed or amended. This is
true in most municipalities.
There is one further reason for excluding mobile homes. They may be
excluded where they would be unable to compete economically with other
land uses, such as dense cities where land values dictate more dwelling
units per acre than the traditional mobile home can provide. Though
there may be no need to exclude mobile homes, (since in most cases they
will not be able to locate there anyway) they may still be excluded
on paper since one view of the purpose of zoning is to correct market
imperfections. An area can be zoned for commercial or multi-family uses,
excluding mobile homes,to insure the highest and best use of the land,
increasing the value of the land at the same time.
In summary, six hypotheses have been constructed as indicators of underly-
ing concerns governing municipal action:
HI: A municipality will have a greater propensity to exclude mobile
homes if it is in a state where mobile homes are not subject to
the property tax.
H2: A municipality will have a greater propensity to exclude.mobile
homes if most of its revenues are dependent on the property tax.
H3: A municipality will have a greater propensity to exclude mobile
homes if a s-ignificant amount of its expenditures goes for schools.
H4: A municipality will have a greater propensity to exclude mobile
homes if it has high per capita wealth.
H5: A municipality will have a greater propensity to exclude mobile
homes if it is experiencing rapid growth.
H6: A municipality will have a greater propens-ity to exclude mobile
homes if it has a high population density.
Data and Methodology
The sample used to test the hypotheses consists of 96 cities and towns
above 25,000 in population. They are rather heavily biased toward the
more restrictive East, consisting of observations from Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Virginia, Vermont,
Oregon, Florida, Maine, and North Carolina.
This is far from an ideal sample and is used by necessity not by choice.
It is derived from the national survey and the state and regional studies
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter on page 26. It consists of
every city and town whose zoning practices are known from these sources
where observations on the other variables are available. The names of the
cities arid towns are listed on Table 14, page 17.
An explanation of each variable that is used and its name follow. The
data source is listed in the appropriate footnote.
HI TAXATION A nominal variable of two categories: property tax,
when the mobile homes in a municipality are subject to a real-estate
or personal property tax; and license system, when mobile homes in
a municipality are subject to a license or special fee.8
H2 REVENUE The percentage of a municipality's revenue that is a
result of the property tax, excluding inter-governmental transfers.9
H3 SCHOOLEX The percentage of a municipality's expenditures devoted
to schools.10
H4 WEALTH The median value of'single family dwellings in a municipality.11
H5 GROWTH Population growth, percentage over 1960-1970.13
H6 DENSITY Population density per square mile. 13
The hypotheses, framed in terms of complete exclusion, are first tested in
two by two tables. (Municipal preferences in restricting mobile homes to
mobile home parks and to non-residential districts, along with further
analysis of complete exclusion follow in later sections of this chapter.
The variables were first dichotomized and then tabulated against the ex-
clusion or non-exclusion of mobile homes. These tables (no.4 through 9)
are shown on the following pages.
There are four numbers in each cell. The first is the absolute frequency
of the occurrences of the event. In the first table (no.4), eighteen
of the ninety-six municipalities in the table operate under a property
tax system and do not exclude mobile homes. The second number is the
percentage of all observations of the row that are in that cell. For
example, in the same table 41.9% of all the municipalities that operate
under a property tax system do not exclude mobile homes (18 of the 43
observations in that row are in that cell). The third number is the
column percentage. 38.3% of all municipalities not excluding mobile
homes operate under a property tax system (18 of the 47 observations
in that column in that cell). The fourth number is the total percen-
tage. 18.8% of the municipalities operate under a property tax system
and do not excludemobile homes. The eighteen observations represent 18.8%'
of the total sample of 96 in the table.
Three statistics are printed below each table. The first, Chi Square, is
used to test the null hypothesis of independence. At a 95% level of
confidence, this can be rejected when Chi-Square is above 3.841. This
does not measure the degree of association but only the chance of the
observed distribution occurring if the variables really are independent.
At the 90% level, Chi-Square will be 2.706 and at the 99% level it is
6.636. The second statistic is phi which is a measure of the extent
to which a table displays mutual association. It ranges from 0 ,
when there is no relationship between the two variables and 1, when
the relationship is perfect. The third, the contingency coefficient,
varies between 0 and .71. It also measures the degree of association,
and has the property of remaining relatively constant in a bivariate
normal distribution if the variables are broken up into more discrete
categories.
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Table 4. Crosstabulation of TAXATIONmethod by which mobile homes are
taxed in a municipality, by BAN, whether or not a municipality
excludes mobile homes.
EAN
TA)AT ICN
PRCPERTY
CCLNT I
RCW' PCT ICCESIN'T CCES
COL PCT T FXCL t DE EYCLL-E
TOT PCT I I I
--------------- I--------I
1 18 1 25 1
TAX I 41.9 I 58.1 I
I 38.3 1 51.0 1
1 18.8 1 ?6.C I
-1I---------I ----- I
LICENSE SYSTEM
CCL UMN
T0TAL
I 29 1 24 I
I 54.7 I 49.3 I
1 61.7 1 49.0 I
1 30.2 I 25.0 I
- 4----------------
47 49
49.0 51.0
RC "q
TCT AL
43
44 .
53
55.2
96
100.0
CCPRFCTEC CHI SQUARE =
PHI = 0.10694
CCNT-INCENCY CCEFFICIENT =
I.C979 1 WITH 1 DEGREE Cr FREEDC
C. 10634
Table 5. Crosstabulation of REVENUE, percentage of municipal revenues
derived from property tax, by BAN, whether or not a munici-
pality completely excludes mobile homes.
REVENUE
CCUNT
RGVh PCT
COL pCT
TCT PCT
BELCW 95%
AB0VE S5%
CCLUMN
TTAL
EAN
I
ICCESN'T CCES
IEXCLLCE EXCLLDE
I I
I----------I---------
1 22 1 5
1 81.5 1 18.5
1 46.8 1 10.2
I 22.9 1 5.2
I
I
I
I
I
I
-1 -----------------I
1 25 I 44 1
I 36.2 I 63.8 I
I 53.2 1 8q.8 I
I 26.0 1 45.8 1
- I------I---1--------I
47 49
49.C 51.0
CCRRECTC CFI SQUAF =
PHI = 0.38381
CCNT-INCGENCY CCEFFICIENT =
14. 14 160 WITH 1 DEGREE CF FREEDCW
C .35832
RC W
TCTAL
27
26 .1
69
71.9
96
100.0
Table 6. Crosstabulation of SCHOOLEX, percentage of
tures spent on schools, by BAN, whether or
completely excludes mobile homes.
municipal expendi-
not a municipality
EAN
CCUNT I
POW PCT IEFSNIT
COL PCT I-XCL.'DF
TCT PCT I
-------- I-------
EELCW 4C1
ABCVE 4c%
CCL U' N
TCTAL
CCES
EXCLLDE
I I
-!---------I
I 33 1 15 1
I 68.8 1 31.3 1
I 70.2 I 30.6 I
I 34.4 1 15.6 1
- I---------I--------- I
I 14 1 34 1
I 29.2 1 7C.8 I
I 29.8 1 69.4 I
I 14.6 I 35.4 1
- I-----------------I
47 49
49.0 51.0
RC W
TrTAL
48
5C.C
48
50.C
96
100.0
CCRPRCTEC CFI SQUAE =
PHI = 0.37503
CCAT'INGECY CGEFFICIENT =
13.50586 WITH 1 DEGPEE OF FPEEDCN
C .35119
SCFOOLEX
Table 7. Crosstabulation of WEALTH, median value of a single family
dwellino in a municiility, by BAN, whether or not a muni-
cipality completely excludes mobile homes.
F N.
COUNT I
R CH POT ICCESN'T rCFS
COL PCT I FXCELC CF DE
TT PCT I I I
-------- I---- ----- I--------- I
I 35 I
1 63.6 1
I 7".5 I
1 36.5 I1
16 I
31.4 I
32.7 I
16.7 T
1 12 1 33 1
1 26.7 1 73.3 1
1 25.5 I 67.3 I
I 12.5 I 34.4 1
I -------- 4I9--------I
47 49
49.0
EELCN 18,500
AB.OVE 18,SOc
CCLUMN
TOTAL
RTCW
53.1
45
46 .9
51.0
CrCRECTEC CFI SQUAPE =
PHI = C.39CO
CCNTIAEACY CCIEFFICIENT =
15.2767 5 WITH I DEGREF OF FPrEDC
r .36S79
WEA1L TF-
100.01
Table 8. Crosstabulation of GROWTH, percentage growth in municipal
population, 1960 to 1970, by BAN, whether or not a munici-
pality completely excludes mobile homes.
CCUNT I
ROW D'CT TECESN'T CCES
COL PCT I EXCLLOE EXCLILDE
TCT PCT I I
--------- I---------I--------
8ELCh E
ABOVF 3
CCLUMN
TOTAL
I 2
1 39.2
I 42.6
I 20. e
31
60.8
63.3
32 .3
-T -------- I -------- I
I 27 1 18 I
I 60.C 1 40.0 1
I 57.4 1 36.7 1
I 28.1 I P.8 I
- I----------
47 49
49.0 51.0
RCW
TO T AL
'51
5? .1
45
46 .
96
100 .C
CCRRECTEC CHI SQIAE =
PHI = .1360
CCNTLNG FNCY CCEFFICIENT =
3.34279 WITH 1 DEGPEF OF FREEIDUC
C . 18344
Table 9. Crosstabulation of DENSITY, municipal population density
per square mile, by BAN, whether or not a municipality
completely excludes mobile homes.
EA\
CCUNT
RCW PCT
COL DCT
TCT PCT
DENSITY
EELC 4700
ABOVE 4700
CC LUMN
TOTAL
I C C ES N I T
IEXCLUDE
3 1I---------
I 39
1 62.9
I 83.0
1 40.6
CCES
EY CL (
I I
23 1
1 37.1 1
I 46.S I
I ?4., I
-I------------------I
1 8 I 26 1
I 23.5 1 76.5 1
I 17.0 I 53.1 1
I 8.3 1 27.1 1
-I1---------I ---------I
47
49.0 51.0
C W
TCTAL
62
64.6
34
31.4
100.c
CCRRFCTEC CHToSUARE =
PHI = C.35491
CCNTINCENCY C9EFFICIENT
12.C9261 WITH 1 OEGREE OF FREEDEv
C .33447
Crosstahulatiorn with Fxyiciinn
Table 4 lends little support to the first hypothesis. One cannot reject
the null hypothesis of independence between the taxation system and the
exclusion or non-exclusion of mobile homes even at the 90% level of
confidence. Indeed, there is a slight pattern showing the opposite of
what was expected. While the sample is evenly distributed between
municipalities excluding or not excluding mobile homes (51%-49%), of
those municipalities in a property tax system, more exclude mobile homes
than do not(58%-42%); and of those municipalities in a license system,
fewer exclude mobile homes than do not exclude them (45%-55%). This divi-
sion of taxation system into two categories does not directly take into
account the varying assessment procedures and tax rates in each category,
and may not adequately reflect the per dwelling tax on mobile homes in
each municipality. Also, since the license system is assumed to be less
expensive to the mobile home dweller than the property tax, occupancy costs
would be less in municipalities under such a system. If this is so, the
mobile home industry might logically direct a more extensive lobbying
effort against complete exclusion in communities under a non-property
tax system, which, if successful, would also account for the observed
distribution in the table.
While it appears that the method by which mobile homes are taxed is not
as important as was thought, the extent of municipal dependence on the
property tax and level of expenditures on education are both significant
determinants of exclusion (tables 5 & 6), suggesting that, while tiere
may not be a direct causal relationship between these variables and ex-
clusion or non-exclusion, fiscal consideration in general may be a cause
of municipal preferences regarding the exclusion of mobile homes. In both
tables the null hypothesis can be rejected at beyond the 99% level, and
while phi does not come close to approaching unity, it is at a level that
is not unreasonable for a cross-sectional sample like the present one.
Neither table contradicts the validity of hypotheses two and three. In
table five, while exclusion and non-exclusion are evenly distributed'in the
sample, those municipalities depending on the property tax for 95% or
more of their revenues exclude mobile homes more often (64% - 36%) than
those municipalities with other sources accounting for more than 5% of
their revenues exclude mobile homes (18% - 81%).. In table six, 71% of
the municipalities spending more than 40% of their budget on schools ban
mobile homes. 68% of those with less than forty cents on the dollar
going for schools do not exclude mobile homes while 31% do exclude them.
In a similar manner, table seven lends as strong support to the hypothesis
that wealthy communities exclude mobile homes more than less wealthy ones.
Table eight displays a pattern that is the reverse of what it was testing.
If a community is experiencing rapid growth, it is more likely not to
exclude mobile homes than to exclude them as was suggested. One would
suspect that mobile homes are, at least, a more significant component of
growth than was assumed when the hypothesis was developed, indicating
that the hypothesis did not test the consideration contained in the
Anderson quote. Further, if the non-exclusion of mobile homes
occurs in municipalities with a general laxness in other development
standards, this demonstrates an attitude and regulatory stance that
would encourage the growth observed in the table.
The crosstabulation of density and ban, table nine, does not contradict
the hypothesis it is testing. Denser municipalities do exclude mobile homes
more (76%-23%) than less dense ones (37%-63%).
Crosstabulation - Restriction and Exclusion
As was noted earlier, most authors attribute the same concerns to the
preferences of municipalities in restricting mobile homes to mobile
home parks and to non-residentially zoned areas as they attribute to the
municipal preferences in excluding mobile homes. This will be examined
below, when each of the motivations are reviewed for their applicability
in explaining these other restrictions.
The restriction of mobile homes to non-residentially zoned areas is almost
as valid a response to the fiscal considerations inherent in the first
three hypothesis as is the complete ban. By restricting mobile homes to
industrial or commercial zones, a municipality can produce tax revenues
from otherwise vacant land, while holding it open for future more inten-
sive and higher revenue, producing, industrial and commercial uses that
can command higher land prices. A mobile home is one of the most temporary
and easily displaced of all land uses. There is still a question of the
costs to a municipality in services provided mobile homes, but if a locality
cannot or will not completely exclude mobile homes, a real or imaginary
cost that is temporary is preferable to the more permanent one that would
occur if mobile homes were permitted in residential areas.
The desire to prevent a decline in residential property values , however,
seems a more plausible reason. The exclusion of mobile homes from
residential areas is as adequate a solution as is the complete exclusion
of mobile homes for both the adjacent home owners protecting their
investment and the mUnicipality protecting its tax base. The restriction
of mobile homes to mobile home parks can also be explained by the
same reasoning. Likewise, the exclusion of mobile homes from residential
areas and restriction to mobile home parks is an adequate solution to the
desire to live among individuals of similar socio-economic status. It
is unlikely that there are any direct fiscal motivations in the restriction
of mobile homes to mobile home parks. However, when combined with their
restriction to industrial and commercial zones, the fiscal reasons for
restriction to industrial and commercial zones are enhanced. The restric-
tion to parks insures that the land remains in one unbroken tract, increas-
ing the feasibility of later conversion to industrial and commercial uses.
Since it was observed that municipalities experiencing rapid growth do not
exclude mobile homes, perhaps out of a general laxness in development con-
trols, it is expected, by the same reasoning, that exclusion from
residential areas will also not occur in these communities. It is unclear,
however, if the restriction of mobile homes to parks will or will not
occur more frequently in fast growing communities, since, while it can
be interpreted as a restriction on development, it may also facilitate
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development by encouraging the development of mobile home parks. Needless
to say, any results of crosstabulation with growth will have little
meaning for the hypothesis for which growth was introduced to test (see
page 39).
The density argument still has merit for explaining the restriction of the
mobile home to parks. One would still expect that more heavily popu-
lated communities would restrict mobile homes to parks, if not
excluding them altogether. This segregation of mobile homes would help
insure the best use of other areas while keeping the land used for
mobile home development in large tracts facilitating future re-use in
more intensive development that would be likely in dense cities. This
also applies to the restriction of mobile homes to industrial and
commercial areas wnen it is used in conjunction with the restriction of
mobile homes to mobile home parks.
The same six variables used in the earlier tables (TAXATION, REVENUE,
SCHOOLEX, WEALTH, GROWTH, AND DENSITY) are tabulated with both restriction
to park and exclusion from residential areas on the following pages. The
zoning restrictions are divided into five categories: no restriction, the
use of the restriction of mobile homes to parks, the use of an exclusion
from residential areas, the concurrent use of the restriction to parks
and exclusion from residential areas, and the use of a complete exclusion.
These tables are a simple extension of the earlier tables. In this
case, the 95% confidence level for chi square is 9.438.
Table 10, (taxation systems by zoning restrictions) shows that municipalities
Table 10. Crosstabulation of TAXATION, method by which mobile homes are taxed in a municipality
by ZONING, whether or not a municipality restricts mobile homes to mobile home parks,
to non-residential areas, or both, or completely excludes them.
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Table 11.. Crosstabulation of REVENUE, percentage of municipal revenues derived from property tax,
by ZONING, whether or not a municipality restricts mobile homes to mobile home parks,
to non-residential areas, or both, or completely excludes them.
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Table 12. Crosstabulation of SCHOOLEX, percentage of municipal expenditures spent on schools,
by ZONiNG, whether or not a municipality restricts mobile homes to mobile home parks,
to ron-residential areas, or both, or completely excludes them.
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.Crosstabulation of WEALTH, median value of a single family dwell
by ZONING, whether or not a municipality restricts mobile homes
to non-residential areas, or both, or completely excludes them.
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Table 13.
Crosstabulation of GROWTH, percentage growth in municipal population 1960 to 1970, by
ZONING, whether or not a .municipality restricts mobile homes to mobile home parks, to
non-residential areas, or both, or completely excludes them.
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Table 14. .
Gf IvJT H
* Crosstabulation of DENSITY, municipal population density per square mile, by ZONING,
wifether or not a municipality restricts mobile homes to mobile home parks, to non-
residential areas, or both, or completely excludes them.
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operating under a property tax system restrict or exclude mobile homes
less often than those operating under a license system. 17.7% of the
municipalities in the sample place none of the restrictions on exclusions
of mobile homes. 32.6% of those municipalities under a property tax
system have no restrictions or exclusions while 5.7% of those under a
license system place no restrictions or exclusions.As was true in the
earlier table (no. 4), municipalities in a property tax system exclude
mobile homes slightly more often than those in a license system. The inter-
esting observation in this table is the frequency with which municipalities
employing one or both restrictions are found to be in a license system.
92% of those municipalities restricting mobile homes to parks are in a
license system, 80% of those municipalities restricting municipalities to
non-residential areas are in a license system, and 83% of those munici-
palities using both restrictions are in a license system. This is com-
pared with the 55% of all municipalities in the sample under a license
system. While the system of taxation appears to have little impact
on a municipality excluding mobile homes, it seems to matter greatly in
the decision to restrict mobile homes. In a property tax system, if a
municipality does not exclude mobile homes, it is likely not to use
either of the two restrictions, restriction to parks and restriction to
non-residential areas. On the other hand, a municipality in a license
system, if it. does not exclude mobile home, will be likely to use one of
the restrictions.
Table 11 tabulates the municipalities' dependence on the property tax by
the use of zoning. The percentage of municipalities restricting mobile
homes to non-residential areas and those employing both restrictions, when
separated by their dependence on the property tax, differ little from the
sample. 5.2% of the entire sample use a restriction to non-residential
areas. 7.4% of the municipalities with less than 95% of their revenues
from the property tax employ this restriction, while 4.3% of those with
more than 95% of their revenues employ it. The same percentages for
those municipalities using both restrictions are: sample: 12.5%, below
95%: 14.8%, above 95%: 11.6%. Unlike these two categories, nearly half
(48.1%) of the municipalities whose revenue from the property tax is
less than 95% of their total revenues restrict mobile homes to parks,
while none of the municipalities with property tax revenue accounting
for more than 95% of total revenues restrict mobile homes to parks. This
does not contradict the argument that there are few fiscal motivations
for restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks. The fiscal reasons
for restricting mobile homes to industrial and commercial areas may not
be as great as was thought.
Table 12 (school expenditures by zoning) has a distribution similar to
table 11 and supports the same conclusions. The principal difference
between the tables is the percentage of municipalities with school expen-
ditures less than 40% of their budget that restrict mobile homes to non-
residential areas. It is 10.4% compared with a sample percentage of 5.2%.
None of the municipalities with school expenditures over 400% restrict
mobile homes to non-residential areas.
Table 13 tabulates wealth by zoning restrictions. The wealthier coimunities
more frequently restrict or exclude mobile homes than the less wealthy
(88.9% to 76.5%). 73.3% of the wealthy municipalities exclude mobile
homes while 31.4% of the less wealthy ones do. However, continuing
the pattern of the previous two tables, 15.6% of the wealthy municipali-
ties employ one of the restrictions and 35.0% of the less wealthy communi-
ties do. One may conclude that while most municipalities exclude or
restrict mobile homes, those with the strongest reasons exclude mobile
homes while others generally restrict or control them in some fashion.
Table 14 tabulates growth by zoning restrictions. 13.5% of the municipali-
ties in the sample restrict mobile homes to parks. 5.9% of the munici-
palities with a growth rate of less than 8% so restrictmobile homes, while
22.2% of those municipalities with a growth rate of greater than 8% do
so restrict mobile homes. This supports the contention that a restriction
to parks is less of a development control than was thought while the other
restrictions are effective.
Table 15 shows the opposite of what was expected in the relationship between
density and the use of the restriction to parks. Instead of the denser
municipalities using the restriction to parks more often, communities
below 4700 population per square mile are the exclusive users of this
restriction. Municipalities above 4700 do use one or more of the restric-
tions or exclusions more often though (94.1% - 75.8%). This is almost
entirely due to their frequent use of the complete exclusion of mobile
homes.
In summary, most municipalities either exclude or place a restriction
on mobile homes. Not surprisingly, communities with more incentive,
fiscal or otherwise, do so more often. These communities, however,
are much more likely to completely exclude mobile homes, while others,
with less incentive, restrict them to mobile home parks and nonresidential
areas. However, the pattern in this second set of tables does not con-
clusively show that the restrictions are not a result of the same motiva-
tions that cause a municipality to exclude mobile homes. The method of
taxation is associated with the decision to restrict but not significantly
with the decision to exclude. Dependence on the property tax, school
expenditures, and wealth are associated with the decision to exclude. A
municipality with over a 95% dependence on the property tax or with
school expenditures over 40%, if it does not exclude mobile homes, is more
likely to place no restriction on mobile homes than to restrict them.
Linear Probability lodel
The crosstabulation on the preceding pages considers the simple relation-
ship between two variables and ignores the possible influence of other
variables on this relationship. While it is possible to construct tables
that hold the other variables constant, this is a tedious process. Rather
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than do this, it was decided to set up a regression where the left hand
dependent variable could be considered the conditional probability of an
event occuring, given the right hand dependent variables. A logit analysis
was first considered, where the probability undergoes a monotonic transfor-
mation and is constrained to lie between zero and one, unlike the linear
model. One advantage of this specification is that the variables are re-
lated in a multiplicative fashion instead of additive.This is more plau-
sible in this situation where one does not expect an independent variable's
contribution on the estimated probability to remain constant regardless
of the values of the other independent variables.15 This analysis was
first applied, using continuous variables, to a determination of the
preferences of the California highway department bureaucracy in route
selection,16 something similar to the problem at hand. Unfortunately,
this analysis involves a maximization procedure and was consequently
too expensive in computer time to be considered.
Returning to the linear probability model, this is'simply performing
ordinary least squares where the left hand variable takes on only two
values, so that one may use unity to indicate the occurrence of an event
and zero to indicate its non-occurrence. By running a multiple regression
on such a dependent variable Y on several explanatory variables X, one can
then interpret the calculated value of Y, for any given X, as an estimate
of the conditional probability of Y, given X. The linear probability
model, unlike the logit analysis, allows only two values '1' or '0' for
the left hand variable. This permits only one restriction or exclusion
to be tested at a time. Complete exclusion of mobile homes is considered
below. It was decided not to do the same for the other two restrictions.
This would have been misleading since they often occur simultaneously
and since a municipality does not make a simple decision to restrict
mobile homes; it is part of a larger decision about both controls.
A linear probability model was formulated using the same variables that
were examined in the preceding section. See page 41 for a list of these
variables and an explanation of their meaning. BAN is a dummy variable;
it has the value '1' when a municipality excludes mobile homes and '0'
when it does not. Taxation is included as a dummy variable. This yields:
BAN = C + a1 WEALTH + a2 SCHOOLEX + a3 REVENUE + a4 DENSITTY + a5 GROWTH +
a6 TAXATION
Using ordinary least squares with t-statistics in parenthesis:
BAN = -0.61 + 0.000017 WEALTH + 0.0064 SCHOOLEX + 0.0043 REVENUE
(-2.47) (1.73) (2.31) (1.58)
+ 0.000049 DENSITY + 0.000054 GROWTH + 0.025 TAXATION
(4.26) (1.27) (0.29)
SSR= 14.259, Std. Error= 0.398
Dropping TAXATION since it is insignificant here and also in the cross-
tabulation; and dropping GROWTH since it also is insignificant and has a
small contribution to the fitted value of BAN (note that GROWTH is
positive, opposite of what would be expected from the crosstabulation
results):
BAN = -0.54 + 0.000017 WEALTH + 0.0070 SCHOOLEX + 0.0034 REVENUE +
(-2.30) (1.77) (2.70) (1.29)
0.000048 DENSITY
(4.28) SSR = 14.512, Std. Error = 0.399
Each coefficient has the expected sign; though one cannot reject a null
hypothesis that the coefficient of PCTTAX is zero or of the opposite sign
at the 95% level. The others are significant at a 95% one-tailed level.
To gain some understanding of the imnportance of each variable, consider
the effect each. one has on ban over its range in the sample. WEALTH
ranges from 33,000 to 11,000 which can produce a difference of as much
as .37 in BAN. Similarly SCHOOLEX varies from 64 to 0 or a difference
of .45 in BAN. REVENUE from 99 to 21 or a difference of .34; DENSITY
from 16,000 to 782 or a difference of .77 in BAN. While this gives some
feeling for the importance of density, one should, to be rigorous, con-
sider the standard error of each coefficient. For example, 90% confidence
interval for REVENUE includes zero, at which point a municipality's
dependence on the property tax does not affect complete exclusion at all.
A plot of the actual and fitted values (which can be interpreted as con-
ditional probabilities) follows after this page. One additional way
of judging this model is to tabulate the number of times it fails to
discriminate between the occurrence of ban and the non-occurrence of ban.
Since the sample is roughly evenly divided between occurrence and non-
occurrencea probability of .5 is an adequate dividing point. The
failures are indicated by a 'F' on the plot and tabulated below.
ACTUAL
BAN no BAN
BAN 47 14
PREDICTED
no BAN 5 30
29 failures, 77 successes, out of 96 cases
Tabl 16 Condi tionalPrbbite ofCmlt Exlso: Aua an Pedcd
ACTUAL F PREDICTED PLOT OF ACTUAL(*) AND PREDICTED(+) VALUES RESIDUAL
Bridgeport
Bristol
Danbury
Hart ford
Me ri den
Mi ddl eton
Mi 1 ford
New Britain
New Haven
New London
No rwa 1k
She 1 t on
Stamford
Torrington
Waterbury
Westhaven
Cranston
E.Providance
Newport
Paw vtucket
Providence
Warwick
Woonsocket
Attleboro
Beverly
Boston
Brock ton
Camb ri dge
C h el sea
Chi c ope e
1.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1 .0
0.9638
0.6077
F 0.7017
0.9121
0.62C6
0.5723
- 0.6067
0.7276
0. EC99
0.6848
F 0.9757
0.5615
F 0.7520
0.9662
0. 52C9
0.5849
0.7130
0.6283
F 0.5615
0 . 704 5
F 0.8067
0. 832C6
F 0.6591
0.7049
F 0.5954
C.62C9
0.9781
0.7043
1.1/2
1. C 22
+4*
*4
*
~*
*
+- *
.*
+
0. 362E-01
0.392
-C. 702
C. 87E-C1
0.379
0.42E
C.393
0.272
0.190
C.315
-C.976
0.438
-0.752
C. 338E-01
0. 479
0.415
0.287
C. 372
-0.562
0.295
-C. 807
C. 179
-0.659
0.295
-C.595
0.379
0.219E-01
0.296
-0.172
-0.216E-01
*
+ *
CITY
Actual and re ictedProbabilities of Complete Exclusion:Table 16
continued
Everett 0
Fall River 1
Fitchburg 0
Gloucester 0
Haverill 0
Holyoke 1
Lawrance 1
Leomister 1
Lowell 0
Lynn 1
Malden 1
Marborough 1
Medford 0
MeIrose 1
N. Bedford 1
Newton 1
Northampton1
Poobody 1
Pittsfield 1
Quincy 0
Revere 1
Salem 1
Some(2rvi l le 1
Springfieldl
Taunton 1
Waltham 1
Westfield 1
Woburn 1
Worcester 1
Concord 0
Manchester 0
Nashua 1
Porsmouth 0
0.6224
1.021
0.5210
0.3823
0.4C59
0.3438
0.5229
0. 7960
0.4723
0.7276
0. 7967
0 .9095
0.5426
C. 9817
0. 9C 14
0.5905
0.9740
0. 51S7
0.61 sF
0.5 366
0.6459
0. 8445
0.7207
1 .352
0. 5921
0.4416
0. P026
0.5114
C. 6488
0.5886
0.7271F-Cl
C. 4884
0.5264
+ *
*
+ *
4- *
+ *
+ *
+ *
*+
Table 16
-0.622
-C.205E-01
-0.521
-0.382
-C.406
C.656
0.477
0.202
-C.472
0.272
0.203
0.905E-01
-0.543
0. 183E-01
0.986E-01
C.41C
C. 26CE-Cl
0.480
0.380
-C.537
C. 354
0.155
0.279
+ -C.352
0.408
0.555
0.197
C.489
0.351
-0.589
-C. 727E-01
C.512
-0.526
continued
Long Branch
Sayerville
New Brunswi
Peth Amboy-
Nor fol k
Portsmouth
Ri chmond
Roanoke
Virainia Be
Buriington
Corval is
Eugene
Medford
Springfield
Clearwater
Daytona Bea
Ft.Lauderda
Gainesville
Hol lywood
Jacksonvill
Lakel and
Melbourne
Orlando
Panama City
Pompano Bea
Tamo a
Titusvil le
Bangor
Lewi ston
Portland
Chapel Hill
Durh a m
Raleigh
0.0
1.0
ck 1.0
'1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
ach0. 0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
ch 0.0
le 0.0
0.0
0.0
e 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
ch 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
F 0.6575
0.8271
F 0.1707E-C1
0.8167
0. 45 15
0.4009
0. 33 384
0.2827
0.5048
0.3404.
0.2562
0.2278
0.1248
0.11119
0. 7413E-C1
-0.2115E-01
0.1996
0.3546E-C1
0.1840
-0.68C6E-01
-0.15S8E-01
-0.4690E-01
0.6485E-01
-0.13c60
0. 1750
-0.1705E-01
-0.1116E-Cl
0.3311
0.4401
F 0.4904
0. 1637
0.2461
4 4
*
+ *4
+ *
* +4
* +
*+4
4*
* +
*+
* +4
+- *
+* .
+*4
+ *
* +4
+4
+*
-C. 657
0.173
0.983
0.183
C. 132
-0.451
-C.401
-C. 338
-0.283
0.495
-C. 34C
-0.256
-0.228
-C.125
-C. 115
-0.74 1E-01
0.21 1E-01
-C. 2CC
-0.355E-01
-0.184
C. 681 E-C1
0. 160E-01
0.469E-01
-C. 64SE-01
0.140
-0.175
0.1 7CE-01
C. 112E-01
-0.331
-C.44C
C.51C
-0.164
-0.246
* +
TablIe 16
Summary
In terms of this analysis, the six tested hypotheses can be evaluated
in the following manner:
A wealthier municipality, everything else held constant, has a greater
propensity to exclude mobile homes than does one with less wealth.
Fiscal considerations are important. The more a municipality must directly
spend on schools, everything else held constant, the greater its propen-
sity to exclude mobile- homes. In a simple two way relationship, the same
holds true for a municipality's dependence on the property tax for revenue,
though when considering the other variables, the effect of a community's
dependence on the property tax is not significant in predicting whether or
not it will exclude mobile homes.
The way mobile homes are taxed in a state bears no relationship to the pro-
pensity of a municipality in that state to exclude mobile homes; it is,
however, a significant determinant of restrictions to parks and non-resi-
dential areas.
Denser municipalities, everything else being equal, have a greater pro--
pensity to exclude mobile homes.
The effect of the rate of population growth is not conclusive. Communities
with high population growth exclude mobile homes less than slower growing
communities; however, holding the other variables constant, the effect is
positive though small and only 90% significant.
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D. IMPACT OF LAND USE CONTROLS ON
THE MOBILE HOME COMPONENT OF THE
HOUSING MARKET
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The exact nature of the impact of land use controls on the mobile home
industry has yet to be empirically demonstrated. To be sure, any effect
is immeasurably complicated by the variety of land use controls, each
of which may differ in dissimilar contexts, by the more than ten thousand
local governments that have implemented a zoning ordinance, and by the
range of actors involved from manufacturer, dealer, and park owner to the
consumer to the local and state governments. Land use controls directly
affect the mobile home market by restricting the quantity and location
of land available for mobile home development. This should influence the
price and quantity of mobile homes in the market as well as the final occupancy
cost of the mobile home dweller.
Land Supply
In the mobile home industry, unlike the conventional housing industry, the
housing unit is built in a factory with the builder having little idea
where the unit will be finally located. Still, the mobile home must eventu-
ally be placed- on a plot of land, either in a mobile home park or outside
of one. Except for replacement units, this process of placing mobile
home 'units on land is, in most cases, controlled by local zoninq ordinances.
No more mobile homes can be produced and sold than there is land availabid~
for them to be placed on. So zoning theoretically limits the quantity of
mobile homes produced by limiting the supply of land available for
them..
This'impact of zoning cannot be gaugedbyreviewing 'the frequency ofzoning
controls and exclusions alone. Even the ultimate impact, complete
exclusion of mobile homes, will sometimes be of questionable significance.
In Westchester County, New York, 42 out of the 44 municipalities exclude
mobile homes entirely.2 Yet how much of a restriction is this? Though
it appears to be severe, one would not expect great immigration of mobile
homes if it were removed. The conventional mobile home park is a combin-
ation of low-cost housing and low density development that necessarily
emphasizes land costs. A mobile home park developer can only pay so much
for expensive suburban and most urban land and remain competitive with
denser forms of low-cost housing such as apartment units.
However, there is some documentary evidence that there is a shortage of
land available for mobile home development. Research on vacancy rates and
new park space construction has been conducted by Program Industrialization
of the Housing Sector at M.I.T.3 Vacancy rates vary widely from state to
state and between regions of the country. In 1972, 26 states had vacancy
rates exceeding ten percent in mobile home parks rated in Woodall's Mobile
Home and Park Directory, 4 a nationwide listing of the better mobile home
parks. However, the Northeastern states (which have generally more res-
trictive land use controls - see table 1 on page 28) have vacancy rates
much lower than this. The New England states had an average vacancy rate
of 2.3% while the Middle Atlantic states had an average vacancy rate of 4.8%.
Eight states in the nation had vacancy rates 3% or lower: Connecticut,
Maine,'Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont and West Virginia.
There is even more persuasive evidence that there may be a shortage of
park spaces in some areas. The Detroit News surveyed twenty-two parks
in its metropolitan area and found waiting lists of over three years
in a majority of them.5 The Kaiser Commission, in interviewing mobile
home park operators in New Jersey, reported that one operator had turned
down four requests for space: the day he was interviewed.6
There is no hard evidence known to this author establishing land-use
controls as one of the causes of this shortagenor has a statistical
correlation between restrictive zoning and reduced land supply been es-
tablished. The individuals closest to this problem, the mobile home
dealers, do perceive such a situation, however. In a 1971 survey of
115 dealers in four northern and four southern cities,59% identified
(lack of) "park space" and 55% identified "local zoning" as "the major
problems facing your business." These figures rose, respectively, to 79%
and 70% among dealers in the generally more restrictive North. 7
Data is available on how this problem translates into lost sales. The
same 1971 survey reported that 24% of all dealers had from 81% to 100%
of their retail sales "dependent on your ability to provide an adequate
park site". 42% of the dealers in the North and 5% in the South responded
in this manner. The 1973 national survey of dealers done by MIT's
Program Industrialization asked for the number of sales lost because of
lack of land (i.e., park space). While one respondent claimed he could
have sold 700% more mobile homes had he had available space, the average
claim among respondents was 49%. Responses from dealers in both Florida
and California (with the largest number of respondents.) had an average
of 42%.8
The complete exclusion of mobile homes from a municipality is likely not
to be the only land use control affecting land supply. Other controls,
appearing less severe could have the same impact. A municipality may
zone only a miniscule portion of its land area for mobile homes or
mobile home parks. The land that is legally available may be unsuitable
for development because of topography or surrounding environment. Res-
trictina mobile homes to industrial and commercial zones economically
limits the land available when these uses can bid a higher price.
'Restraints such as these can also be inconsistent with marketing and
/investment conditions required by developers while at the same time permit-
ting mobile homes as a legal use.
The point of this is that zoning may well be restricting the sales and
production of mobile homes. It is necessary to establish this since
the production of the unit is physically and temporally separated from
the es.tablishment of a mobile home on a site zoned for mobile homes.
Cost of Product
If one defines cost of product as final consumer occupancy cost, then
land-use controls effect that cost in several ways. The most obvious
is that a limitation in the supply of land, or more technically, a shift
in the supply curve with an unchanged demand curve, results in a higher
market price for land.
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This, of course, depends on the premise that land use controls do limit
land supply or shift the supply curve.
However, limiting the supply of land available for mobile homes is
only one aspect of this phenomenfl. Restricting mobile homes to generally
more expensive industrial or commercial land instead of residential
areas increases costs due to its higher income producing opportunity value.
'This is still a demand and supply situation as above; mobile home develop-
brs are compelled to compete in a different market for their land, one
created by the product differentiation accomplished by zoning.
There are two specific impacts on cost from the land use control system.
First, mobile homes are often allowed only as a conditional use or by
special permit. The necessary filing and legal fees paid by the developer are
eventually borne by the mobile home occupant. It~is not known, however,
whether this occurs more often in mobile home development than in other types
of conventional construction. Since land costs are a greater proportion of
mobile home occupancy costs than in conventional housing,9 these development
costs can be more significant even thouqh they occur just as often in both
conventional and mobile home development.
Second, subdivision controls add to the cost of land and associated site
work. As applied to mobile home parks, they frequently restrict mobile
homes to mobile home parks and they allow their construction in a
certain district if the developers agree to provide, at his own expense,
improvements as specified by the municipality. In a 1972 study of New
Jersey, George Stenlieb has demonstrated for convention housing that
subdivision controls in general are a highly sionificant determinant of
final selling price, but one that could not be adequately measured
"given the present uniformity of a high level of standards".10
Empirical Work & Methodoloay
The intention of this chapter is to determine whether municipal land-
use controls have a demonstrable effect on the price and quantity of
mobile homes sold in the United States. Having specified a suitable
model, it is intended to use the model to show that exclusionary land-
use controls raise the price and limit the quantity of mobile homes
and land supplied to the consumer.
Empirical work specifically directed at the mobile home component of
the housing industry has been generally limited in scope and purpose.
For example, the problem of what to do with mobile homes often surfaces
when one is working with the housing market in the United States. In
a 1970 Federal Home Loan Bank Board working paper on the housing market1l
the only variables used to explain the quantity of mobile homes produced
were a constant, the Boeckh Construction Cost Index, and a time
trend variable.
In addition, research concerned with the impact of the land-use control
system on conventional housing markets is complicated by the fine grain
of its implementation. Ten thousand governments have a zoning ordinance1 -
and many more have the power to implement one if they wish. Existing
studies have been limited to one local area or have been designed as
comparative research between two cities or two subdivisions for this
reason. For example, see George Sternlieb's 1972 study of zoning and
housing costs in New Jersey. 13
Formulation of Model - Demand Equation
Owing to the nature of the data available on zoning regulation of mobile
homes, one is limited to constructing a cross-section model by state
for the period 1969-1970. Since mobile homes are the dominant form of
housing in the below $25,000, they would appear to be an inferior good;
one would then expect income and the cost of conventional housing to
appear in the demand equation. As income goes up, fewer mobile homes
would be demanded as individuals could more easily afford conventional
housing. An increase in the cost of conventional housing would increase
demand for mobile homes as fewer people could then afford conventional
housing. Since the primary market for mobile homes is young families,
the percentage of households headed by individuals less than thirty-five
years old is included. A higher percentage of young households would
indicate a greater demand for mobile homes. Finally, the net household
formation rate is included. A positive sign is also expected for this
variable. A governmental variable is included: a dummy variable
which is zero when mobile homes are taxed by real estate or personal
taxes and unity when mobile homes are taxed by fees and/or licenses.
The fee system, in most cases, measurably reduces the amount of taxes
typically paid by the mobile home dweller. The demand equation is:
QD = aP + C + a2 INCOME + a3 HOUSE CST + a4 HSHD 35
a5HSHDCHG + a6 TAX
where: Q is quantity/1000 households
P is price
C is a constant
INCOME is the median family income in the state.15
HOUSECST is the annual cost of housing for a five room unit 16
HSHD35 is the percentage of household heads less than 35
years old.17
HSHD CHG is the percentage change in the number of households
1967 to 1968
TAX is a dummy variable; unity when mobile homes are subject
to fees and licenses rather than real and personal pro-
19
perty taxes.
The Supply Equation
The hypothesis being tested is that municipal land-use regulation limits
the quantity and raises the price of mobile homes at the retail level.
They do this by regulating the land supply available for siting of a
mobile home which will limit mobile home sales and raise prices for both
mobile homes units and the available land. Three land use controls are
consid'ered: the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home parks, the
restriction of mobile homes to nonresidentially zoned areas, and the
complete exclusion of mobile homes. While an argument can be made that
the first two restrictions alter the attributes of the mobile home housing
package and thereby also belong in-the demand equation, this is
assumed to be a second order effect. Therefore, both restrictions ap-
pear only in the supply equation.
As cost of construction varies from state to state, this also is inclu-
ded in the supply equation, as it increases the suppliers' costs, posi-
tively affecting price and depressing quantity. The equation is then:
Q = bi P + C + b2 BAN + b3 PARKS + b4 NONRES + b5 BUILD CST
where
Q is quantity per thousand households
P is price
C is a constant
PARKS is the percentage of municipalities requiring location of
mobile homes in a mobile home park of all municipalities
permitting mobile homes in a state.20
NONRES is the percentage of municipalities prohibiting location
in a residentail district of all municipalities permitting
mobile homes in a state. 21
BAN is the percentage of municipalities in a state completely
excluding mobile homes. 22
BUILD CST is an index of the cost of framed construction.23
The model as it stands now consists of two simultaneous equations with
two endogenous variables and nine predetermined variables, four which
are excluded from the demand equation and five which are excluded from
the supply equation. Therefore both equations are identified.
Data
Up to this point the method by which price and quantity will be measured
has not been explained. This problem is especially acute in the mobile
home market since the mobile home is usually sold separately from
the land on which it is ultimately placed. Due to this situation, and
because the retail price is not reported except as a national average,24
it was decided to first estimate the entire model for only rental mobile
homes. This allows one to estimate both the price and quantity reduced
form equations for roughly ten percent of the mobile home market and then
compare the quantity reduced form coefficients with those of
the quantity reduced form equation estimated for the entire mobile
home market. This procedure makes no assumption about the equivalence of
the two markets. One hopes, however, that an understanding of the effects
of the land use controls on the rental market will aid in explaining their
impacts on the entire market.
The model, when used in the rental market, remains essentially the same
with the exception of TAX which now properly belongs in the supply
equation as the landlord is paying the taxes. The equations are still
identified. Quantity (Q) is the number of rental mobile homes in a state
that were manufactured in 1969 and .197025. This is adjusted for size by
the mean number *6f rooms reported. 27 Price (P) is the median rent paid
by renters in mobile homes that were manufactured in 1969-197028 adjusted
in a similar manner.
The land-use controls in the supply equation measure the percentage of
municipalities in each. state that use each land-use control. These
are derived from the same information used in Table 1, page 28. This
forces the assumption that, for states with the same percentage of
municipalities using a control, the pattern of the distribution of use
between urban, suburban, and rural municipalities (pages 30-34) is also
the same.
To quantify the effect of land use controls on the mobile home market, one
cannot simply use the number of mobile homes sold in a certain period as
a measure of quantity.- Not all of the mobile homes sold come into contact
with a municipality's land use control system. Those sold as replacements
for older mobile homes can be located on the site of the retired unit
that previously conformed with the zoning ordinance. This is especially
true of units in a mobile home park. Therefore, the quantity variable
is adjusted by an estimate of the number of mobile homes retired from the
mobile home stock in that state.
Unfortunately such a figure is difficult to come by. From two sources,
it is known that a quarter of the mobile homes sold are bought by people
who previously owned a mobile home. 29 This represents 8% of the present
mobile home stock. From industry production figures3 0 and the 1970
census 31, it can be shown that 75% of the mobile homes manufactured
between 1965 and 1968 are still in use. 69% of the stock added between
1960 and 1965 is still in use. This figure drops to 38% for those units
made between 1950 and 1959. This indicates an average life of somewhere
around ten years, or 10% of the stock being retired each year if pro-
duction was constant. Since thfe production of mobile homes has generally
been increasing from year to year, the figure should be considerably less
than ten percent of the total stock. I have estimated the replacement
rate to be five percent of the total stock. Therefore, the quantity figure
in the equation is reduced by five percent of the mobile home stock in
a state-
Analysis - Rental Market Structural Equations
After preliminary investigation several of the variables were deleted
simplifying the equations. HSHD<35, the percentage of household heads below
35 years of age, and HOUSE._CST, an index of the cost of housing, were
removed from the demand equation. BUILDCST, an index of the cost of
construction, and TAX, a dummy variable for the method of taxation, were
dropped from the supply equation. In each case the t-statistic was below
1.00 and the coefficient had the wrong sign.
The model is now (with t-statistics in parentheses and using two stage
least squares);
DEMAND:
Quantity = -0.013 PRICE + 2.54 -0.00012 INCOME + 0.11 HSHD CHG
(-1. 24) (2.64) (-2.41) (1.64)
F = 3.08 F9 5 % = 2.84SSR = 5. 27 Std. err. = 0.37
SUPPLY:
Price = -13.84 QUANTITY + 121.81 + 0.051 BAN + 0.022 NONRES -0.15 PARKS
(-1.39) (26.36) (0.38) (0.21) (-1.67)
SSR = 8182.93 Std. err. = 14.87 F = 1.07 F95% = 2.61.
The coefficients of the first equation, the demand equation, have the
expected signs; however neither PRICE nor HSHD CHG have t-statistics that
allow rejection of the hypothesis that their coefficient is zero at a
95% level of confidence in a one-tailed test. HSHD CHG is near the 95%
value (1.68), while PRICE is just under the 90% level (1.30).
The supply equation is less well off. Its F statistic is not high enough
to reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero at a
95% confidence level. Quantity has the wrong sign; one would expect it
to be positive since this is a supply equation. In a two-tailed test,
it is significant at only the 80% confidence level. Of three regulation
variables, BAN, NONRES, and PARKS, two, the complete exclusion of
mobile homes and their restriction to non-residential areas have very poor
t-statistics. The third, restriction of mobile homes to parks, is signi-
ficant at a 90% confidence level in a two tailed test. Its sign is the
opposite of what was expected, though this is plausible if one makes the
argument that in states where restriction to parks is high, a greater
percentage of rental mobile homes are located in mobile home parks and
that rental costs are less in mobile home parks than on scattered single
lots, perhaps due to economies of scale.
Considering its t-statistic, the coefficient of quantity could well be
zero. This suggests the possibility of a horizontal supply curve. Con-
sidering the relative newness of the industry and its rapid growth of the
past decade, there could be a shortage situation with excess demand for
rental mobile homes, allowing the supplier to set an artificially high
and constant price that is unaffected by quantity. The elasticity of
price (rent) with respect to quantity would then be zero.
Alternatively, one could accept the negative sign of the coefficient
of quantity as valid, indicating that the industry as a whole has a down-
ward sloping supply curve over the range of observations in the sample.
The more mobile homes supplied, the lower the price. This, of course, is
the whole idea behind industrialized housing, the taking advantage of
increasing returns to scale possible by mass producing housing off-site
in a factory. This economy of scale by the manufacturer is observable
in the rental market since states with a high number of rental units per
household also have a high number of owner-occupied mobile homes per house-
hold. However, it is tenuous to attribute these scale economies entirely
to the manufacturer, since states with relatively large numbers of rental
units might be likely to have a greater percentage of their rental units
owned by large landlords who would also be able to show economies of scale.
To clarify the relationship between the supply and demand curves, both
curves 'are graphed on the following page, Figure 17. The two curves are
drawn for the mean value of each of the other variables besides price and
quantity in the supply and demand equation. The mean values of each var-
iable are:
Figure 17 Supply and Demand of
Rental Mobile ~Homes
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As in the equations, price is the median rent and quantity is the number
of rental mobile homes that were manufactured in 1969 and 1970. Quantity
is per one thousand households adjusted for replacements by five percent
of the rental stock. This accounts for the negative observations for
quantity. The curves are shown for the range of observations on price and
quantity in this sample. The supply curve undoubtedly does not continue
downward, but will likely reach a turning point and track upwards when
quantity is large enough to no longer result in economies of scale.
Fiqure 17 shows demand and supply holding everything else constant at their
mean values. For example, figure 18 diplays the effect income has on
demand, holding supply constant. Raising median income shifts the demand
curve to the left, reducing the number of mobile homes rented and increas-
ing price. When the median family income of a state is $11,000 instead
of $9135, the equilibrium between supply and demand is at a point where
0.22 fewer units per thousand households are rented at a price that is about
five dollars greater, holding supply constant. States with low median
incomes would have a demand curve shifted to the right, resulting in a
greater quantity sold at a lower price. As shown, when median income is
$7000, .26 more units per thousand households are rented at a price about
six dollars less than the price when income was $9135.
In a similar fashion, the shifts in the supply curves, with demand constant,
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Figure 20 Effects of NONRES on
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possible from changes in BAN, NONRES, and PARKS are shown, respectively,
on figures 19, 20, and 21. BAN, wfrich has a mean of 16.5%, ranges from
0% to 95% in the sample. The shifts in the supply curve when BAN
is 0% and 95% are shown, resulting in new equilibrium points. A higher
value of BAN results in less quantity at a higher price and less BAN
results in a greater quantity at a lower price. The effects of changes
in NONRES and PARKS are also shown for the maximum and minimum values
of each that occurred in te -sample.
Analysis - Rental Market Reduced Form Equations
The information in the preceding figures can be quantified when the demand
and supply equations are solved for the price and quantity reduced form
equations. This yields:
QUANTITY = 1.33 - 0.00092 BAN - 0.00040 NONRES + 0.0027 PARKS
-0.00012 INCOME + 0.15 HSHD CHG
PRICE = 105.68 + 0.062 BAN + 0.027 NONRES - 0.18 PARKS
+ 0.0020 INCOME - 1.86 HSHD CHG
It is evident from both the reduced form coefficients and figures 19, 20, & 21,
that the impacts of changes in BAN and NONRES are not as great as changes
in PARKS, the difference being about one order of magnitude. Also, as
noted earlier the effect of more restriction to parks, as opposed to the
effect of BAN and NONRES, is to depress price and increase quantity in
the rental market. This is attributed to the economies of scale a large
landlord in a park would have contrasted with single units on individual
lots owned by smaller landlords.
Analysis - Entire Market
Since observations on price were not available for ovner-occupied mobile
homes, supply and demand equations could not be estimated for this market.
It is possible to estimate the quantity reduced form equation when price
is solved out of the demand and supply equations.
In terms of the coefficients of the demand and supply equations on pages
80 and 81, this quantity equation is:
Q = a1/(b1 -albl) Cs + 1/(1-a 1 ) CD + alb 2/(bl-alb 1 ) BAN + alb 3/(b1 -alb 1 ) PARKS
+ a1 b4/(b1 -alb 1 ) NONRES + aib 5/(b1-a bl) BUILDCST + a2/1-al INCOME
+ a3/l-a1 HOUSECST + a4/1-a1 HSHD<35 + a5/1-a1 HSHDCHG + a6/1-a1 TAX
Using ordinary least squares, this is estimated as
Q = 27.73 + 0.0070 BAN -0.018 PARKS -0.028 NONRES -0.0083 BUILD CST
(3.00) (0.21) (-0.98) (-1.33) (-1.71)
-0.0086 INCOME +0.0C014 HOUSE CST - 0.011 HSHD<35 + 1.15 HSHDCHG
(-1.22) (0.025) (-0.78) (2.01)
-1.12 FAX
-(-1 .08)
R2 = 0.532 F = 4.03 F95%= 2.21 SSR = 252.6 Std. err. = 2.81
Deleting TAX, HSHD<35, HOUSECST and BUILDCST, this becomes
Q = 15.26 + 0.0053 BAN - 0.024 PARKS -0.024 NONRES - 0.0012 INCOME
(4.82) (0.19) (-1.22) (-1.44) (-3.34)
+ 1.42 HSHD CHG
(2.63)
R2 = 0.467 F = 6.31 F95% = 2.50 SSR = 287.4 Std. Err. = 2.83
In comparison with the quantity reduced form for the rental market
(page 93 ), the quantity equation for the entire market has a negative
coefficient for PARKS. This indicates that, contrary to the situation
in the rental market, the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home
parks depresses quantity and probably increases price in the entire
market. INCOME and HSHD CHG have the same signs in both equations.
The coefficients of these variables in the entire market equation are
an order of magnitude larger than those in the rental market equation.
This is explained by the fact that the quantity of mobile homes in the
entire market is an order of magnitude larger than the quantity of mobile
homes in the rental market.
NONRES, the restriction of mobile homes to nonresidential areas, is the same
sign in both eqaations. However, it is two orders of magnitude larger in
the entire market, indicating that its negative effect on quantity is an
order of magnitude more important in the rental market.
The coefficients of BAN, complete exclusion, are of opposite signs in the
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two equations. It may, however be zero in the entire market equations,
indicating that BAN has a negligable impact on quantity in this
market.
It is possible to test whether or not, in terms of this model, the two
markets are structurally identical. The appropriate test of such overall
homogeneity would be:32
(u'u-u*'u*)/((T1 +T2 ~k) - (T1+T2-2k))
u*'u*/(T 1+T2-2k)
which is distributed as F with ((T1+T2 -k)-(T1 +T2 -2k)) and (Tl+T 2-2k)
degrees of freedom and where:
u is the vector of calculated residuals in the restricted case
u* is the vector of calculated residuals in the unrestricted cases
T, and T2 are the number of observations and
k is the number of parameters
Using ordinary least squares to estimate the rental reduced form equation
and the restricted equation of both samples, this statistic becomes:
F = (.1173.99 - 291.34)/(42 + 42 - 5) - (42 +42 - 10)
291.34/ (42 + 42 - 5)
= 882.65/5
291.34/74 = 44.80 with 5 and 74 degrees. of freedom
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Since F99% (5,74) =.3.30, the null hypothesis that the reduced form equations
are the same can be rejected at a confidence level over 99%.
Summary
In terms of the intention of this chapter, given the limitations of this
model, municipal land-use controls do have a demonstrable effect on the
price and quantity of mobile homes sold in the United States. Specifically
the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home parks, while it may in indivi-
dual cases limit the quantity of rental mobile homes, has the net effect of
increasing the quantity and lowering the rent in the rental moible home
market.
The restriction of mobile homes to nonresidential areas has a net effect
of raising the price and limiting the quantity of rental mobile homes in
the market. Compared with the changes in price and quantity induced by
restriction to park, the absolute value of the changes attributable to the
restriction to nonresidentially areas are much less.
In the rental market, changes in price and quantity attributed to the complete
exclusion of mobile homes are smaller still. It has the net effect of
raising price and depressing quantity.
In contrast, the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home parks has the
opposite effect in the entire market for mobile homes. Here the use of this
restriction reduces the quantity of mobile homes sold. The result of the
rental market analysis, with this observation, tend to support the conclu-
sion that the restriction of mobile homes to parks depresses the quantity
of mobile homes in the entire market but concurrently raises the percentage
of rental mobile homes in this market. Whether or not this restriction
raises the price of mobile homes depends most on whether one believes the
supply curve to have a negative slope, as is the case in the rental market.
Since the null hypothesis, both markets being equivalent, was rejected
so strongly and since the demand variables (INCOME & HSHDCHG) had very
similar coefficients in the quantity reduced form equations for both
markets, one might speculate this is not the case.
The restriction of mobile homes to nonresidential areas has the identical
effect on quantity in the entire market as the restriction to parks has.
Also, restriction of mobile homes to nonresidential areas has the same effect
on quantity in the rental market, though, its effect is an order of
magnitude larger in the entire market after taking into account the mag-
nitude of quantity in-both markets.
The model tends to support the conclusion that the complete exclusion of
mobile homes has no effect on the quantity of mobile homes sold. This is
the most unexpected of all the results of this model. It is peculiar
that the two restrictions on mobile homes had a definate impact while
complete exclusion, which would seem to be the most severe of the three, did
not.
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Of all the drawbacks to this model, the greatest may be its non-dynamic
specification, especially when one considers the volitile cycles of the
housing industry's history. Limiting the model to cross-sectional data,
though it was unavoidable, may well have contributed to the insignifi-
cance of complete exclusion noted above, as well as the general applic-
ability of the model.
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E. CONCLUSIONS IN LIGHT
OF PRESENT TRENDS
103
The present land-use control system is undergoing considerable change
in its content and source of authority. Many of these trends affect
mobile homes and parks, and, in some cases, the development of the mobile
home as a more significant housing resource.
,The use of the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home parks, as con-
trasted wfth the more constant level of the two other controls considered
earlier, has increased significantly over the past decade. Additionally,
%in a 1973 survey of state planning officials, 2 a majority expected still
,further increases in the use of this restriction by the municipalities in
- thei.r state while expecting no change or decreases in the use of complete
exclusion and the restriction of mobile homes to nonresidential areas.
This will mean that the mobile home park will become an even more dominent
form of land-use by mobile homes than it is now (in 1968, sixty percent
of new mobile homes were located in a park 3 ).
This rise in the use of the restriction of mobile homes to mobile home
parks partially reflects a recent change in the underlying motivations
for its application. The original reason for its use was a response to
small unsightly backyard trailer parks infringing on the residential
neighborhoods and for reasons of public health and sanitation. It is
more frequently used today as a part of a whole genre of regulatory
devices seeking to directly effect the quality of development. For example
one sta-te official has recently stated that
"(The) Planning and Zoning Commissions are now requiring that all
mobile homes be confined to mobile home parks with all proper
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sanitary facilities, electrical underground lines, beautification
programs such as a certain number of trees per acre, separate
laundry facilities for homes that do not contain washers and
dryers, separate enclosed storage areas, etc."4
'The most important of these regulatory devices being applied to mobile
homes are subdivision controls. Long applied to conventional housing,
they involve the imposition on the developer of various requirements
on the project such as minimum area and number of spaces, sewers, recrea-
tional areas, roadways and landscaping. The exact details of subdivision
controls on mobile home parks vary from municipality to municipality; how-
ever, they are typically flexible devices that require some sort of
decision or approval from a local administrative body. Consequently,
local governments can exercise more flexibility over the control of mobile
home parks. The choice is no longer between simply allowing mobile
home development with little control over quality and not allowing mobile
homes. As a result, park developers have been forced, in order to gain
approval, to construct parks of higher quality than they otherwise would
have.
This has two significant results. First, in so far as the decision to
exclude mobile homes is a result of a fear of declining property values
I from the low-quality, low-income image of the mobile homes (see pages
3,4, 35, 'and.j8), there is likely to be greater acceptance of mobile
. homes. Subdivision controls can be used to create a park that is aesthe-
.tically acceptable to the community.
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1 Second, the trend towards higher quality parks creates a market for
innovative product development on the part of the mobile home industry.
As mentioned earlier (page 10), the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation's
designs for a National Homes Corporation product line were scrapped
partially because of the lack of a suitable park development for them.
The observed trend to higher quality parks will alleviate this impasse
by providing a market for product improvements on the part of the manu-
facturers.
Equally important, the manufacturers will have demands placed on them for
a better product by the park developers. Developers will require, higher
quality mobile homes for protection of their greater investment in mobile
home parks. They may be forced to develop higher density parks to offset
,this investment. The municipality, in allowing a mobile home park, will
falso require the park developer to guarantee standards for the mobile homes
Os well as the park itself. These trends will aggregate the market for
mobile homes as the park developer deals more often with the manufacturers
Ito insure a product that meets his requirements. This will be strengthened
,by the increased use of mobile home subdivisions as the consumer realizes
their advantages and the park developers turns to them to improve his
cash flow after making the larger initial investment required by the quality
parks. The increased use of the restriction of mobile homes to mobile
home parks will also facillitate rental mobile home developments (page 97),
which increases market aggregation.
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This aggregation, allowing an individual to demand a quality unit at a
significant volume is an important development in the mobile home housing
market. Despite its innovative past, the manufacturers, with few exceptions,
have recently been sluggish in the further development of their product.
The aggregation mentioned above could change this, as developers contract
with manufacturers for a large amount of quality units. An example of
this situation is the Oriental Masonic Gardens development in New Haven
Conneticut, designed by Paul Rudolph.5 (Illustration on following page)
Oriental Masonic Gardens is a 148 dwelling unit moderate income housing
cooperative built under Sec. 236 nonprofit financing in 1971. Though
it is legally not a mobile home park, it is a case of a developer contract-
ing with a manufacturer in the mobile home industry-for the delivery of
a quantity of relatively innovative units.
The increased use of subdivision controls and the restriction of mobile
homes to parks serve to encourage the construction of mobile home parks
that are acceptable to the municipality, overcoming the fear of declining
property values in that- community. The favorable example of a quality
park will also increase the acceptance of mobile homes under similar
conditions in adjacent communities. However, a municipality's decision
to exclude mobile homes due to fiscal considerations may not be measurably
affected. Unless mobile homes increase in value enough to allow higher
assessments (which is inconsistent with their role as low-income housing),
municipalities will continue to exclude mobile homes because of fiscal
concerns. The most equable answer to this and similar impasses is prob-
ably some form of property tax relief.
Oriental Masonic Gardens, New Haven, Conn.
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A real solution to the fiscal zoning and the property tax problem seems
unlikely. However, the power of municipalities to exclude mobile homes
and other low-income housing will be potentially limited by developments
in two other areas. There is a trend towards greater judicial supervision
of local zoning restrictions and an increasing state and federal
assumption of land use policy.
Until recently, the courts have been reluctant to critically examine the
limits of zoning. Traditionally, zoning cases have been represented in
terms of police power vs. private property rights. Recently, the courts
have looked beyond the property owners' free use of their land and have
considered the area wide impact of local land use restrictions. 6 They
are requiring that the zoning power be exercised in terms of the general
welfare of the broader community. Although these cases do not include
mobile homes, their reasoning is applicable to the problem of exclusion
or restriction of mobile homes. The possible success of zoning challenges
in the future will help reduce the complete exclusion of mobile homes
from municipalities.
The court challenges present little possibility for a broad change in the
land use control system, as each is limited to the factual situation of
that case. A more direct approach is now being adopted by various state
legislatures7 and the Federal Government 8 which involves the pre-emption
by the s-tate of a municipality's power to control land development. The
state legislation varies widely in kind and scope, reflecting the nature
of the'problems and the political climate of each state. In all cases
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local governments have lost some of .their autonomy in favor of promoting
state and regional needs. While there is no direct mention of mobile
homes in this legislation, it seems likely that local zoning ordinances
will, in the future, partially reflect the metropolitan housing problem
as well as local concerns.
In summary, it is likely to become more difficult for municipalities to
completely exclude mobile homes. The increasingly more sophisticated use
of subdivision controls and the restriction of mobile homes to parks allow
a municipality and a park developer to negotiate sufficient tradeoffs to
make a mobile home park more acceptable to the municipality. This will
result in an larger market for a higher quality mobile home and a test-
ing ground for innovative product development on the part of manufacturers.
The developers will increasingly be specifying standards for mobile homes
in their parks and, in some cases, dealing directly with the manufacturers
and assuming some of the functions of the mobile home dealer. They will
be in a position to stimulate the manufacturers to produce a higher quality
form of low cost manufactured housing, either out of their own interest
or by an appropriate governmental intervention.
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